Kansas Statute pertaining to Voluntary Manslaughter

21-3403. Voluntary manslaughter

21-3403 .. Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional killing of a human being committed:
(a) Upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion; or
(b) upon an unreasonable but honest belief that circumstances existed that justified deadly force under K.S.A. 21-3211, 21-3212 or 21-3213 and amendments thereto ...


21-3211. Use of force in defense of a person; no duty to retreat.

21-3211 ... (a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent it appears to such person and such person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to defend such person or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force.
(b) A person is justified in the use of deadly force under circumstances described in subsection (a) if such person reasonably believes deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to such person or a third person ...


21-3212. Use of force in defense of dwelling; no duty to retreat.

21-3212 ... (a) A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that it appears to such person and such person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon such person's dwelling or occupied vehicle.
(b) A person is justified in the use of deadly force to prevent or terminate unlawful entry into or attack upon any dwelling or occupied vehicle if such person reasonably believes deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to such person or another ...


21-3213. Use of force in defense of property other than a dwelling.

21-3213 ... A person who is lawfully in possession of property other than a dwelling is justified in the threat or use of force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with such property. Only such degree of force or threat thereof as a reasonable man would deem necessary to prevent or terminate the interference may intentionally be used.



Struggle4Progress's post at Democratic Underground

The voluntary manslaughter defense requires sudden quarrel, heat of passion, or Roeder's honest belief that Tiller posed an imminent threat to Roeder or a third person or was attempting to illegally enter or attack Roeder's dwelling or occupied vehicle or was attempting to interfere illegally with Roeder's property. Now Roeder hunted out Tiller at church and shot him down while he was serving as an usher. Most possibilities here (such as sudden quarrel or heat of passion argument) are probably ruled out by the context and/or the obvious indications of premeditation. Moreover, the judge is unlikely to countenance highly bizarre strategies: for example, if the defense wanted to argue that Roeder honestly believed he was defending himself in his occupied vehicle from Tiller, the judge would probably allow such an argument only as part of an insanity defense, not as part of a voluntary manslaughter defense. And of course, although the approach sought by the defense, on ideological grounds, would be that Roeder was defending a third party, the judge has ruled this out; the defense is therefore likely to argue instead that Roeder killed Tiller in the honest belief that Tiller posed an imminent threat to a third party. The word "imminent" here most probably does not include "tomorrow" or "next week," but rather means something like "instant" or "immediate," and one should probably expect a careful discussion of "imminent" in the final instructions to the jury: there will be some real problems with I took my gun and went to the church, where I shot an usher (who I had been stalking) in an honest belief he posed an imminent threat to a third party. Roeder is entitled to a defense, but if this is his defense then he has a steep uphill fight

With regard to the second point, subpoenas will only issue if relevant, and the bar will be very high if the subpoena would intrude on the rights of otherwise uninvolved parties. The sphere of "imminent threat" may extend to the general environs of the crime scene, and may include a period enclosing the church service, but it is very unlikely to extend to Tiller's clinic and his practice there. The defense will, of course, attempt to enlarge the spheres of time and space for the "imminent threat," but I think the judge is unlikely to allow much enlargement